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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THE ALLEGED LEASE 
PAYMENT TERM UNAMBIGUOUS, AND BY PRECLUDING EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE OF ITS MEANING. 
Appellees Eagar, Inc. and L. Stanley Bell ("Bell") acknowledge the following facts 
are undisputed: In connection with the sale of Eager's business (the "Business"), Bell also 
wanted to lease from Eagar the Property on which the Business was operated. The terms of 
the alleged lease were set forth in two documents: (1) a written counteroffer (the 
"Counteroffer"), accepted by Bell, which included the following term: "Lease 5 year. Triple 
Net. Fix Rate First 24 Month. $2,281 + 3 Net Balance 3 years. Tie to CPI plus one 5 year 
option;" and (2) a "Contingency Removal," which contained the following provision: 
Seller hereby guarantees to deliver to purchaser a valid lease which has a base 
rent of $2,281 per month for the first 24 months. Plus three years additional 
with an adjusted base tied to the C.P.I, plus one five year option to renew; 
also tied to the Consumer Price Index. The Lease shall be Triple-Net. The 
Lease will be drawn up outside the Closing. 
See R. 221 at f^ 13; 223; R. 71 (emphasis added). Bell says those provisions mean that 
monthly lease payments will increase in the third and subsequent years only by the 
percentage reflected by the CPI. Eagar believes they provide for payments to rise in the third 
year to fair-market value, and in subsequent years according to the CPI. 
As established by Eagar's initial brief, both parties' interpretations are plausible. Bell 
attempts to escape this fact by arguing that the exact words used by Eagar in his 
interpretation are not found in any of the documents. However, the precise words that create 
the meaning Bell urges also are absent from any of the relevant documents. Bell's argument 
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illustrates the problem in this case: the contract provisions in question are not clearly and 
precisely defined and, therefore, offer insufficient guidance for the trial court to determine 
the correct interpretation. As a result, those provisions are vague and subject to more than 
one reasonable interpretation. Consequently, as a matter of law, the trial court should have 
considered Eagar's extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent. See Interwest Constr. 
v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996); Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co.. 899 
P.2d 700, 766 (Utah 1995). Seare v. University of Utah School of Medicine, 882 P.2d 673, 
677 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The trial court erred by refusing to do so. 
II. THE DOCTRINE THAT CONTRACTS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
AGAINST THE DRAFTER DOES NOT SUPPORT BELL'S POSITION, 
Bell attempts to defend the trial court's actions by arguing that Eagar's extrinsic 
evidence need not be considered because any uncertainty with respect to construction of a 
contract should be resolved against the drafter who, in this case, was Eagar. Bell 
"misapprehends the doctrine that contracts should be construed against the drafter." Wilburn 
v. Interstate Elec. 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). As noted by this Court, 
The doctrine does not operate in dispositive fashion simply because ambiguity 
has been found. Once a contract is deemed ambiguous, the next order of 
business is to admit extrinsic evidence to aid in interpretation of the contract. 
It is only after extrinsic evidence is considered and the court is still uncertain 
as to the intention of the parties that ambiguities should be construed against 
the drafter. In other words, the doctrine of construing ambiguities in a contract 
against the drafter functions as a kind of tie-breaker, used as a last resort by the 
fact-finder after the receipt and consideration of all pertinent extrinsic evidence 
has left unresolved what the parties actually intended. 
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Id. The applicable rule has been summarized as follows: 
After applying all of the ordinary processes of interpretation, including all 
existing usages, general, local, technical, trade, and the custom and agreement 
of the two parties with each other, having admitted in evidence and duly 
weighed all the relevant circumstances and communications between the 
parties, there may still be doubt as to the meaning that should be given and 
made effective by the court. If . . . the remaining doubt as to the proper 
interpretation is merely as to which of two possible and reasonable meanings 
should be adopted, the court will adopt that one which is less favorable in its 
legal effect to the party who chose the words. 
Id. at 586 (citing 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 559 (I960)). 
Thus, the doctrine that contracts should be construed against the drafter does not 
support Bell's position. As noted above, that doctrine requires that all relevant extrinsic 
evidence be considered when interpreting a contract. In fact, the doctrine applies only if, 
after all evidence is considered, ambiguity still exists. In this case, all of the extrinsic 
evidence presented to the trial court supports Eagar's position. See Eagar's Initial Brief at 
3-7. Thus, after examination of that evidence, there will be no doubt that there was no 
meeting of the minds. 
HI. EAGAR IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
Bell contends that by arguing for summary judgment on his own behalf, Eagar 
concedes that there are no factual issues and, therefore, that he is not entitled to summary 
judgment. This argument makes no sense and demonstrates that Bell does not understand 
the parties' respective claims and burdens of proof. 
Bell moved for summary judgment on his declaratory relief claim. Through that 
claim, Bell sought an order indicating that the parties agreed the alleged lease. Thus, in order 
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to prevail on his motion, Bell had to prove, through undisputed evidence, that he and Eagar 
agreed to all the material lease terms. As noted above and in Eagar's initial brief, Bell did 
not satisfy his burden. Consequently, summary judgment for Bell was inappropriate. 
Eagar's claim was the direct opposite of Bell's. Eagar sought declaratory relief 
indicating that, although the parties had attempted to negotiate a lease, they never agreed 
upon a mutually-acceptable lease. To defeat Eagar's motion for summary judgment on that 
claim, Bell had to profer admissible evidence that he and Eagar agreed to all essential terms. 
See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) ("It is 
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential 
to the formation of a contract"); Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 584 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("[I]n order to create an enforceable contract, the parties must mutually 
agree to all essential terms of the supposed agreement") (internal quotation and citation 
omitted); Piston v. EnviroPak Medical Prod., Inc., 893 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) ("[A] contract can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the parties are 
set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed"). Bell failed to do so, 
responding only with conclusory allegations. See R. 399-402; 504-05. Bell's failure in this 
regard, and Eagar's extrinsic evidence, established that it was undisputed that Bell and Eagar 
did not agree on the essential elements of the alleged lease. Thus, Eagar was entitled to 
summary judgment. 
In sum, because Bell failed to establish an undisputed agreement to all essential terms 
of the alleged lease, summary judgment in Bell's favor was precluded and Eagar was entitled 
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to a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of law, no enforceable lease existed. The trial 
court's denial of Eagar's motion was therefore erroneous and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Eagar respectfully requests that this Court: (1) reverse the 
trial court's grant of Bell's motion for partial summary judgment; (2) reverse the trial court's 
denial of Eagar's motion for summary judgment; and (3) remand the matter for further 
proceedings consistent with this Court's rulings. 
DATED this 29th day of June, 2000. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
PaurM. Durham 
Steve K. Gordon 
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaimant 
and Appellant James LeRoy Eagar 
Page -5-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 29th day of June, 2000,1 caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Wesley C. Argyle 
David O. Black 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE 
96 West 200 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Page -6-
